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Abstract
The accurate modeling of travelers’ route choice decision making when faced with unreliable (risky) travel times is
necessary for the assessment of policies aimed at improving travel time reliability. Compared with econometric models,
process models have not been investigated in travel decision making under risk. A process model aims to describe the
actual decision making procedure and could potentially provide a better explanation to route choice behavior. A process
model, the priority heuristic (Brandstatter et al. , 2006), is introduced to the travel choice context and its probabilistic
version, the probabilistic priority heuristic (PPH) model, is developed in this study. With data collected from a stated
preference survey, a rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) model and two other alternative models are compared with
the PPHmodel through cross validation. Results showed that the PPHmodel outperforms the RDEUmodel in both data-
ﬁtting and predictive performances. This suggests that the process modeling paradigm could be a promising new area
in travel behavior research. Major drawbacks of the PPH model include the discontinuity of the choice probability with
respect to outcomes and associated probabilities, the limited applicability in situations where one alternative dominates
or almost dominates the other, and the non-trivial extension to multiple-alternative situations.
c© 2013 Hengliang Tian and Song Gao. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of
Delft University of Technology
Keywords: decision under risk, route choice, process model, rank-dependent expected utility model
1. Introduction and the Priority Heuristic
Understanding travel decision making in an uncertain environment and predicting travel choices in such
an environment are important components in the overall goal of building a more reliable and eﬃcient trans-
portation system. Econometric (random utility) models are the generally accepted paradigm for choice
modeling in transportation. They are adjusted to tackle the decision under risk problem, ranging from sim-
ply adding a risk measure (e.g., travel time standard deviation, deviation of actual from estimated travel
time) to the utility function (Lam & Small, 2001; Bogers & van Zuylen, 2005; Ben-Elia et al. , 2013), to
probabilistic versions of non-expected utility models from behavioral economics that captures non-linear
subjective perceptions of both probabilities and outcomes, such as cumulative prospect theory (CPT) and
rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory (Schwanen & Ettema, 2009; Razo & Gao, 2013). Econo-
metric models, such as CPT and RDEU applied in a travel decision making context, assume that decision
makers integrate the outcomes and the associated probabilities of an alternative into one single measure of
its worth (utility) and the alternative with higher utility will be chosen. See de Palma et al. (2008) for a
review of the cross fertilization of the theories of decision under risk and discrete choice models.
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However, one area in decision theory that is missing in travel behavior modeling is the process modeling
paradigm, which aims to capture a decision maker’s actual decision process, usually with eﬃcient and frugal
heuristics rather than correlating the choices with explanatory variables through complicated mathematical
formula as in econometric models.
One of the popular process models is the parameter-free priority heuristic (PH) proposed in Brandstatter
et al. (2006). PH supposes that a decision maker does not make trade-oﬀs between outcomes and probabil-
ities, but uses information in a non-compensatory manner. The ﬁnal decision is obtained through a series of
comparisons of outcomes and/or probabilities (termed “reasons”). Speciﬁcally, in the situation of two alter-
natives with two outcomes (minimum and maximum in terms of the absolute values in the domain of gain
or loss), the order of comparison is minimum outcome, probability of minimum outcome and maximum
outcome.
• Step 1: compare two minimumoutcomes. If the diﬀerence is larger than 1/10 (deﬁned as the aspiration
level) of the higher maximum outcome, the more attractive alternative (larger minimum outcome in
the domain of gain, and smaller minimum outcome in the domain of loss) is chosen and the process
stops. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
• Step 2: compare probabilities of two minimum outcomes. If the diﬀerence is larger than 0.1, the
more attractive alternative (smaller minimum-outcome probability in the domain of gain, and larger
minimum-outcome probability in the domain of loss) is chosen and the process stops. Otherwise, go
to Step 3.
• Step 3: compare two maximum outcomes. The more attractive alternative (larger maximum outcome
in the domain of gain, and smaller maximum outcome in the domain of loss) is chosen and the process
stops.
We give an example to show how the PH works. Consider two alternatives in the domain of gain:
(4000, 0.2; 0, 0.8) vs (3000, 0.25; 0, 0.75).
At the ﬁrst reason, both alternatives have the same minimum outcome (0), which is less than 1/10*4000,
and thus we move to the second reason. At the second reason, the diﬀerence between the probabilities of
minimum outcomes, 0.8 - 0.75, is less than 0.1, and thus we move to the third and last reason. At the third
reason, the ﬁrst alternative has a larger maximum outcome and thus it is chosen.
The priority heuristic is simple in several respects. It typically consults only one or a few reasons; even
if all are screened, it bases its choice on only one reason. Probabilities are treated as linear (in contrast to the
non-linear transformation of probabilities in CPT), and a 1/10 aspiration level is used for all reasons except
the last, in which the amount of diﬀerence is ignored. No parameters for overweighting small probabilities
and underweighting large probabilities or for the value function are built in.
Brandstatter et al. (2006) has shown that the PH can account for evidence at variance with expected
utility theory, namely a) the Allais paradox, b) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, c) risk seeking
for gains if probabilities are low (e.g., buying lottery tickets), d) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are
low (e.g., buying insurance), e) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, f) the certainty eﬀect, g)
the possibility eﬀect, and h) intransitivities. A wide range of choice problems were used in (Brandstatter
et al. , 2006) to compare the predictive performance of PH and other well-known theories of decision under
risk, including CPT model (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and TAX (Transfer of Attention Exchange) model
(Birnbaum, 1997). PH model gave comparable or superior performance in most situations.
Some researchers are skeptical of the PH. Johnson et al. (2008) conducted an experiment in web
browsers running MouselabWEB (Willemsen & Johnson, 2012) to collect subjects’ actual behavior dur-
ing a decision making. Attention and transitions across elements of each alternative were recorded. It was
found that transitions between outcomes across alternatives were rare and outcomes-probabilities transitions
were common. This ﬁnding contradicted with PH. In addition, it was hypothesized that when PH stopped at
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step 1, attentions between two minimums should be observed dominantly while attentions of two minimum-
probabilities and maximums should not be observed or very few. The actual observations from experiment
suggested that attentions were evenly distributed across outcomes and probabilities.
Glockner & Betsch (2008) pointed out that two strong restrictions have been imposed on the PH as
described in Brandstatter et al. (2006): 1) the PH does not work in the situation where one alternative
dominates the other one such as: (0, 1%, 1, 99%) vs (2, 50%; 30, 50%) (in the domain of gain) where PH
model will make a wrong prediction. 2) The accuracy of the PH will decrease dramatically when the ratio
of two alternatives’ expected outcome values exceed 2, such as 20 vs (0, 1%; 100, 99%) (in the domain of
gain). These two restrictions help the PH exclude more than 50% cases where it is not good at when all
scenarios are randomly generated, and thus it is doubtful whether the PH can be used as a general theory of
decision under risk.
While the debate about the PH is going on, we think it worthwhile to investigate its applicability in a
travel decision making context. The original PH is suitable for predicting majority choices, but appears to
be less suited to provide proportional predictions. In order to predict the percentage of demand for each
route in the traﬃc network, we construct a probabilistic PH model (Rieskamp, 2008). It is estimated using
an existing SP (stated preference) dataset collected by the authors for investigating the RDEU model (Razo
& Gao, 2013).
RDEU model and two other alternative models are introduced for comparison with the process model.
The two other models have no underlying behavioral theories, and are designed for data ﬁtting. They
potentially can provide upper bounds on the goodness-of-ﬁt and enable a more thorough assessment of the
PPHmodel. Cross validation is ﬁnally conducted to investigate the data ﬁtting and predicting performance of
these four models. Note that the model assessment is based on the prediction of the ﬁnal choice, rather than
observations of the actual decision process, which will require much more detailed process data (Johnson
et al. , 2008).
2. Probabilistic Priority Heuristic (PPH) Model
2.1. Model Development
We develop a probabilistic version of the PH similar to Rieskamp (2008) to predict the proportion of
demand for each route in a traﬃc network, while the deterministic PH is only able to predict the majority
choice. In the initial application of the PH to our dataset, when the threshold used in the comparison of
minimum outcomes changed from the default 10% to 20%, the predictive accuracy of the PH improved con-
siderably. This ﬁnding suggested that the PHmodel could be improved by estimating threshold values rather
than using the default 10%. Conceivably comparing minimum outcomes (min), probabilities of minimum
outcomes (pr) and then maximum outcomes (max) is not necessarily the only comparing order. The other
ﬁve potential orders should also be considered: 2) min, max and pr; 3) max, min and pr; 4) max, pr and min;
5) pr, max and min; 6) pr, min and max. The existence of diﬀerent comparing orders has been discussed in
Hilbig (2008).
We treat all travel times as losses and in the remainder of the paper we work in the domain of loss
only. Consider two alternatives A and B, each with two probabilistic outcomes (in absolute values) and the
associated probabilities in the domain of loss,
(Amin, Apr; Amax, 1 − Apr) and (Bmin, Bpr; Bmax, 1 − Bpr),
where the minimum (maximum) outcomes are deﬁned by absolute values (e.g., a travel time of 10 minutes
is a smaller loss than 15 minutes). Note that a lower loss (maximum or minimum) is more attractive, and a
higher probability of the minimum loss is more attractive. Let R denote a reason, and R = min,max, pr.
Error terms AR and BR are added to the objective values of reason R for the two alternatives respectively.
Error terms for diﬀerent reasons are independent, but do not necessarily have the same variance (scale).
If R is not the last reason, the probability of choosing A at reason R is the probability that the diﬀerence
(the direction of taking the diﬀerence depends on the reason) between the noise-added reason values is
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greater than a threshold δR between 0 and 1, multiplied by the maximum outcome in the choice situation
M = max(Amax, Bmax).
PR(A) = Prob(−[(AR + AR) − (BR + BR)] > δRM),R = max,min. (1)
PR(A) = Prob((AR + AR) − (BR + BR) > δRM),R = pr. (2)
Similarly, the probability of choosing B at reason R if R is not the last reason is
PR(B) = Prob(−[(BR + BR) − (AR + AR)] > δRM),R = max,min. (3)
PR(B) = Prob((BR + BR) − (AR + AR) > δRM),R = pr. (4)
When δR is positive, PR(A)+PR(B) < 1, and the probability of not making a decision at reason R and moving
to the next reason is 1− PR(A)− PR(B). If δR is zero, the model collapses to a utility maximization one, and
PR(A) + PR(B) = 1.
If R is the last reason, a decision must be made, and thus δR is set to 0. The probability of choosing A at
the last reason R is thus
PR(A) = Prob(−(AR + AR) > −(BR + BR)),R = max,min. (5)
PR(A) = Prob(AR + AR > BR + BR),R = pr. (6)
The probability of choosing B at the last reason R is 1 − PAR.
For a given reason R, the diﬀerence of the error terms AR−BR eﬀectively adds noises to the threshold of
the reason δRM, and captures the fact that diﬀerent decision makers could have diﬀerent thresholds. Other
potential contributors to the noise include perception errors of outcomes and probabilities, and missing
attributes. Theoretically if certain independent continuous distributions are assumed for the perception
errors of the two outcomes of an alternative, the designations of the maximum and minimum outcomemight
be reversed for some realizations of the error terms, compared to the objective designation. We believe that
such situations rarely happen in reality as decision makers generally can diﬀerentiate a good outcome from
a bad outcome. Therefore we maintain the maximum and minimum outcome designation based on their
objective values. The perception error, as only one part of the error term, is assumed to be not large enough
to reverse the ordering.
The unconditional probability of choosing A is thus the sum of three components, each corresponding
to a reason,
P(A) = PR1(A)+ (Reason 1)
PR2(A)(1 − PR1 (A) − PR1 (B)) (Reason 2)
PR3(A)(1 − PR1 (A) − PR1 (B))(1− PR2 (A) − PR2 (B)). (Reason 3)
(7)
2.2. Discontinuity of the PPH Model
The choice probability of an alternative calculated from a PPH model can be discontinuous with respect
to the outcomes and/or probabilities of the alternative outcome distributions, due to the discrete nature of
deﬁning the minimum and/or maximum outcomes. Two typical situations are discussed below, one with the
probability and the other with the outcome.
Consider the comparing order of min, max, and pr. When the probability of the minimum outcome of
alternative A, Apr approaches 0 but remains a positive number, Amin remains the minimum outcome of alter-
native A. However when Apr is exactly 0, the outcome distribution of alternative A collapse to a deterministic
one (Amax, 1) and the minimum outcome is the same as the maximum outcome Amax. The discontinuity in
the change of the minimum outcome from Amin to Amax at Apr = 0 will result in the discontinuity of the ﬁnal
probability of choosing A at the same location.
Consider again the comparing order of min, max, and pr. When Amin approaches Amax but is not equal
to Amax, the probability of the minimum outcome remains Apr. However when Amin is equal to Amax, the
outcome distribution of alternative A collapse to a deterministic one, (Amin, 1), and the probability of the
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minimum outcome becomes 1. The discontinuity in the change of the probability of the minimum outcome
from Apr to 1 at Amin = Amax will result in the discontinuity of the ﬁnal probability of choosing A at the same
location.
The discontinuity could make it diﬃcult to interpret model predictions at and close to the location of
discontinuity. An example is shown later in Figure 4 with discussions provided in Section 6.1.
3. Test Design
We brieﬂy present the test design detailed in Razo & Gao (2013). An abstract network is shown in
Figure 1 and a screenshot in Figure 2. A subject had a choice between a path with a random travel time
(Path A with a high travel time of tH with probability p and low travel time of tL with probability (1 − p),
the risky route), and a path with a deterministic travel time (Path B with a travel time of tB, the safe route).
Fig. 1. The Abstract Network
With the advantage of simplicity and clarity as compared to describing the scenarios in written or verbal
form, this SP survey was conducted using interactive graphical maps with a point-and-click interface (shown
in Figure 2) presented to a subject on a computer screen. Routes in green color are assigned as buttons for
subjects to click. The white labels, 30 and 40, indicate the usual travel time of the adjacent route with the
unit of minute. The yellow label beside the risky link indicates the probability of a delay and the full travel
time of this path in the event of a delay. With a factorial design, the probability of delay (p) could be 20%,
50% and 80%. tL was ﬁxed at 30 minutes throughout all scenarios. tH took values 40, 50, and 60 while tB
took values from 35 to 55 with a step size of 5 such that the safe route was not dominated by the risky route.
Including introduction, paperwork and the survey, each session lasted 40 to 60 minutes for each subject.
74 individual subjects were recruited from the University of Massachusetts Amherst students and staﬀ
community and surrounding areas. The mean age was 24.2 years and mean driving experience was 6.9
years. 54% of the subjects were male, 46% were female.
The survey included this map as a simple risk map to test subjects’ risk attitude and another strategy
map to investigate people’s strategic route choice behavior. The strategic map data are not used in this study.
Each subject made choices in 24 diﬀerent scenarios in the simple risk map with a total of 1,767 observations
(9 observations are missing due to problems in transmitting data).
4. Model Speciﬁcation
The PPH model developed in the previous section is a general model without speciﬁcations of the dis-
tributions of random error terms. It is adapted to the actual choice problem in the survey. An alternative-
speciﬁc constant (ASC) is added to the risky route for each reason, ASCmin, ASCmax, ASCpr. These variables
are used to capture potential biases towards either one of the two routes, e.g., the risky route has two seg-
ments and could be viewed as less desirable due to the extra eﬀort involved in clicking on the map.
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Fig. 2. Screenshot of the Survey Interface
The error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. Gumbel across observations and alternatives for the same reason.
We simplify the variance structure across reasons, by assuming that error terms for min and max have the
same standard deviation, and that the standard deviation of the error terms for pr is 1/60 of that for min
and max (60 is an approximate magnitude of the travel times in the survey). These assumptions reduce the
number of scale parameters to only one, λ for pr.
The probabilities of choosing A (risky route) and B (safe route) at reason R if R is not the last reason
(R = min,max) are respectively
PR(A) = 11 + exp{−(λ/60)[−(ASCR + AR − BR) − δRM]} , (8)
PR(B) = 11 + exp{−(λ/60)[−(BR − ASCR − AR) − δRM]} . (9)
The probabilities of choosing A and B at reason pr if pr is not the last reason, are respectively
Ppr(A) = 11 + exp{−λ[(ASCpr + Apr − Bpr) − δprM]} , (10)
Ppr(B) = 11 + exp{−λ[(Bpr − ASCpr − Apr) − δprM]} . (11)
The probability of choosing A at the last reason R = min,max is
PR(A) = 11 + exp{−(λ/60)[−(ASCR + AR − BR)]} . (12)
The probability of choosing A at the last reason pr is
Ppr(A) = 11 + exp{−λ[ASCpr + Apr − Bpr]} . (13)
The unconditional probability of choosing A, P(A) can be obtained by substituting these probabilities into
Eq. (7), and P(B) = 1 − P(A).
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To account for the panel eﬀect that a subject made choices in multiple scenarios, the ASC for the ﬁrst
reason is treated as a normally distributed random variable across subjects and its mean and standard devia-
tion are estimated.
Seven parameters are thus to be estimated: two threshold values for the ﬁrst two reasons (δmin, δmax,
δpr depending on which two are the ﬁrst), one scale (λ), three ASCs for three reasons (ASCmin, ASCmax,
ASCpr), and the standard deviation of the ﬁrst ASC.
The major diﬀerences of our model from that of Rieskamp (2008) include: 1) ASCs are included to
capture innate biases in a travel choice context, while the choice scenarios used in Rieskamp (2008) are
based on stated lotteries and do not entail ASCs in general; 2) The panel eﬀect is accounted for while
Rieskamp (2008) ignores it; 3) The error terms are Gumbel distributed instead of normal to enhance the
tractability of the model.
5. Estimation Results
Table 1. Estimation Results of PPH models (Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. 74 subjects and 1,767 observations. 7
parameters for each model.)
PPH 1 PPH 2 PPH 3 PPH 4 PPH 5 PPH 6
min,pr,max min,max,pr max,min,pr max,pr,min pr,max,min pr,min,max
Scale 28.8 21.3 24.6 19.9 31.1 27.9
λ (2.30) (1.23) (1.41) (0.989) (1.99) (1.82)
ASCmin μ:-19.3 μ:9.51 -29.1 15.6 -72.0 8.91
(1.29) (0.430) (1.93) (0.408) (0) (0.446)
σ:1.66 σ:2.09
(0.261) (0.409)
ASCmax -15.5 -11.0 μ:26.2 μ:-22.4 11.2 -7.79
(0.711) (0.485) (0.737 ) (0.582) (1.09) (0.478)
σ:1.87 σ:0
(0.397) (0)
ASCpr 0.195 0.334 0.396 0.514 μ:0.517 μ:0.517
(0.00513) (0.0293) (0.0197) (0.00920) (0.00537) (0.00594)
σ:0.0239 σ:0.0284
(0.0071) (0.00915)
δmin 0.627 0.135 0.802 NA NA 0.139
(0.0243) (0.00672) ( 0.0336) (NA) (NA) (0.0071)
δmax NA 0.111 0.784 0.391 0.402 NA
(NA) (0.00879) (0.0107) (0.00677) (0.0205) (NA)
δpr 0.0323 NA NA 0.349 0.338 0.343
(0.00589) (NA) (NA) (0.00862) (0.00595) (0.00717)
FLL -816.539 -826.779 -800.085 -880.671 -831.959 -828.892
ρ
2 0.328 0.319 0.341 0.275 0.315 0.318
PPH models with all six potential comparing orders are estimated in BIOGEME Python 2.0 (Bierlaire,
2003, 2008) with 1,000 simulation draws for the normally distributed ASCs. Results are shown in Table 1.
FLL stands for the ﬁnal log likelihood. ρ2 = 1 − (FLL − K)/L0 is the measure of ﬁtness (Ben-Akiva &
Lerman, 1985), where L0 is the log likelihood of the naive (equal-probability) model, and K is the number
of parameters. All parameters are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, except the standard deviation of ASCmax
in PPH 4. PPH 3 (max, min and pr) has the best model ﬁt (ρ2 = 0.341) and the order is diﬀerent from
the original order (min, pr and max) posited in Brandstatter et al. (2006). This can be explained by the
following two observations. 1) Travelers are generally very concerned about delays, and likely to consider
the maximum outcome (delay on the risky route) ﬁrst. 2) The survey scenarios were grouped by delay
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probability (for reasons not related to this study), and thus subjects were likely not paying attention to the
probability while it remained constant.
Thresholds of min, pr and max diﬀer very much in diﬀerent models. Estimated values of δmin and δmax
are 0.802 and 0.784 respectively for PPH 3, much higher than the original 0.1. Similar high values are found
in previous studies (Rieskamp, 2008). It is not entirely clear why such high values of thresholds exist, and
future research is needed to understand whether people truly use such high thresholds or they are the result
of a wrong underlying theory.
It is not straightforward to interpret ASCs in a PPH model. In a typical utility maximization model
such as the REDU model discussed in the next section, ASC is used to capture the bias towards a certain
alternative and its sign indicate the direction of the bias. In the PPH model, however, the ﬁnal probability of
choosing a given alternative is a complex function of all three ASCs. Unless all three ASCs have the same
sign, it is not straightforward what eﬀect it will have on the choice probabilities. The only way to ﬁnd out
is to calculate the probability of choosing an alternative assuming the two alternatives have the same travel
time distribution (“everything else equal”). However, “everything else equal” can be ambiguous. When
the two alternatives have the same travel time distribution so that AR and BR cancel out for all reasons, the
probability still depends on M, and thus varies across contexts.
6. Three Alternative Models
6.1. RDEU model
One of the most popular non-expected utility (non-EU) theories (Starmer, 2000) is the rank-dependent
expected utility (RDEU) theory (Quiggin, 1982; Schmeidler, 1989). A decision maker is supposed to maxi-
mize
V(x, p) =
m∑
i=1
πiu(xi), (14)
where x and p denote vectors of travel time outcomes (in absolute values) and associated probabilities
respectively with a size of m.
u(x) is a value function of outcomes and takes a power functional form.
u(x) = −xβ. (15)
β < 1 indicates a decreasing sensitivity to outcome.
πi is the decision weight for outcome i. It is related to the weighting function w(p) that takes the form
w(p) = p
δ
(
pδ + (1 − p)δ)1/δ
, δ > 0.279, (16)
and describes distorted perceptions of objective probabilities following Tversky & Kahneman (1992). A
smaller δ suggests a more pronounced inverted S-shape. See Figure 3 for an illustration (red solid line). The
blue dotted line shows a perfect perception with δ = 1. w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 suggest that people have
no problem perceiving impossibility and certainty. The sensitivity to probability diminishes when moving
away from the two extreme points p = 0 and p = 1, represented by a ﬂatter curve toward the middle point
between 0 and 1.
With a sorted outcome sequence x1, x2, . . . , xm by absolute values, the decision weight of outcome i is
πi = w(pi + pi+1 + · · · + pm) − w(pi+1 + · · · + pm), (17)
and πm = w(pm).
When the RDEU model is applied to a route choice scenario from the survey, the utility of risky route
with the parameter vector φ = {ASC, λ, β, δ} is
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Fig. 3. Probability Weighting Function
V(A) = ASC + λ
[
(tH)βw(p) + (tL)β (1 − w(p))
]
. (18)
Note that the negative sign before the power function in Eq. (15) is absorbed by the scale parameter λ.
ASC denotes a bias towards the risky route, and is a normally distributed random variable across subjects to
account for the panel eﬀect.
The utility of the safe route is
V(Safe) = λ(tB)β. (19)
The utilities are applied to a Logit function to yield the probability of a given choice observation.
P(i) = exp(V(i))∑
j=A,B exp(V( j))
(20)
Table 2 presents estimation results of the RDEU model with 1,767 route choice observations from 74
subjects. The negative sign of the mean of the ASC (μ = -0.933) indicates subjects’ average preference
towards the safe route when everything else is equal. The diminishing sensitivity to outcome is conﬁrmed
by β < 1, as well as an inverted S-shaped weighting function (0.279 < δ < 1). Comparing Tables 2 and 1 we
ﬁnd that 5 out of 6 PPH models obtain better goodness-of-ﬁt than the RDEU model. Note that the REDU
model has already been shown to outperform a number of other models, including the mean-variance, mean-
standard deviation models and their variations and the expected utility model (Razo & Gao, 2013).
Figure 4 shows the probabilities of choosing the risky route calculated from the PPH 3 (green line) and
REDU (red line) models as functions of the delay probability (0 to 1) in ﬁve situations. All ﬁve situations
have the same travel time probabilistic outcomes on the risky route, 30 and 60. The travel time on the safe
route varies from 35 to 55 with a step size of 5 across the ﬁve situations. The dots at 0 and 1 for the PPH 3
model indicate its discontinuity at those locations.
The general decreasing trends (except at p = 1 for the PPH model) are consistent with the intuition that
a higher chance of delay on the risky route reduces its attractiveness. The shapes of the curves however
are considerably diﬀerent. The REDU curves seem smoother, while the PPH 3 curves have ﬁve distinctive
sections: two discontinuous locations at 0 and 1, two relatively ﬂat sections close to 0 and 1, and one
decreasing section in the middle. The cause of discontinuity is discussed in Section 2.2. As such it is
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Table 2. Estimation Results of the RDEU Model (Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.)
Risky Branch μ: -0.933
Bias (0.144)
ASC σ: 0.529
(0.115)
Scale -1.48
λ (0.570)
Value Func. 0.720
β (0.0749)
Weight. Func. 0.616
δ (0.0232)
Final LL -840.872
ρ
2 0.309
diﬃcult to interpret PPH 3 model results at and close to the two extreme locations, which are consistent
with the original PH’s restrictions discussed in Brandstatter et al. (2006) that it models diﬃcult decisions,
not all decisions. It does not apply to pairs of alternatives in which one alternative dominates the other one
(the delay probability is 0 or 1), and it also does not apply to “easy” problems in which the expected values
are strikingly diﬀerent (the delay probability is close to 0 or 1). It is of interest for future research to extend
the PPH model so that it is applicable to extreme cases.
6.2. Dummy Model
The other two models have no underlying decision theories and are simply ﬁtting the data. Therefore
they probably have better data-ﬁtting performance and could produce an upper limit on the goodness-of-ﬁt
so that the performance of the PPH model can be better assessed.
The ﬁrst of the two is a dummy model with a large number of dummy variables to ﬁt the choice propor-
tion for each possible scenario. It was proposed by graduate students from the Department of Statistics at
the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
The utility of the safe route is assigned as 0. The utility of the risky route is:
V(A) = ASC + β1 ∗ 1p=0.5 + β2 ∗ 1p=0.8 + β3 ∗ 1tH=50 (21)
+β4 ∗ 1tH=60 + β5 ∗ 1tH=120 + β6 ∗ 1tB=40
+β7 ∗ 1tB=45 + β8 ∗ 1tB=50 + β9 ∗ 1tB=55.
ASC is a normally distributed random variable across subjects, following the same assumption in the PPH
and RDEU models. 1event is a 0-1 variables that is equal to 1 if the event is true and 0 otherwise.
The probability to choose the risky route over safe route is:
P(A) = 1
1 + exp(−V(A)) (22)
6.3. EER Model
Another similar logit regression model was proposed by Ernan Haruvy and a winner in a choice predic-
tion competition (Erev et al. , 2010). The prediction competition produced two data sets, one for estimation
that was provided to the competing groups and one for prediction that was not provided. Submitted models
were estimated based on the estimation set only, and they competed in terms predictive accuracies based on
the prediction set calculated by the organizers.
The utility of the safe route is assigned as 0. The utility of the risky route is
V(A) = ASC + β1 ∗ tH + β2 ∗ tL + β3 ∗ tB + γ1 ∗ p + γ2 ∗ EXP. (23)
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Fig. 4. Probabilities of Choosing the Risky Route as Functions of the Delay Probability
EXP is the expected travel time of the risky route. ASC is a normally distributed random variable across
subjects. Eq. (22) can be applied here to calculate the probability to choose the risky route. The model is
named EER after the ﬁrst three authors of Erev et al. (2010).
7. Cross Validation
Cross validation is a method to assess diﬀerent models’ forecasting ability within the same data pop-
ulation. First, we generate 10 independent data sets from the original data set (1,767 observations of 74
subjects). Each time, 2/3 of the subjects’ data are randomly chosen as the training set for model estimation,
while the remaining 1/3 subjects’ data are used as the validation set to test models’ predictive performance.
For example, in the 1st data set, 44 subjects with 1,054 observations are randomly chosen for model estima-
tion. The remaining 30 subjects’ 713 observations are used for validation.
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7.1. Criteria
The mean squared distance (MSD) is used to compare the performance in addition to the adjusted rho
squared. The squared distance (SD) is deﬁned as the squared diﬀerence between the calculated probability
to choose the risky route and the observed proportion of subjects that choose the risky route in one scenario.
MSD is then an average of SDs over all scenarios.
7.2. Results
Table 3. Average Performance Measures of the Four Models
Dummy PPH 3 EER RDEU
Average over FLL -515.432 -535.013 -543.619 -561.170
10 estimation data sets ρ2 0.355 0.336 0.328 0.306
MSD 0.0075 0.0157 0.0189 0.0240
Average over FLL -259.595 -268.095 -273.97 -281.778
10 prediction data sets ρ2 0.338 0.327 0.318 0.299
MSD 0.0136 0.0221 0.0256 0.0299
No. of Param. 11 7 5 5
Four competing models’ estimation and prediction results in 10 data sets can be found in Tables 4 and
5. Average performance measures are presented in Table 3, and the ranking in terms of both estimation
and prediction performance is (from best to worst): Dummy, PPH 3, EER and RDEU. In general we see a
drop of performance level in the prediction set compared with the estimation set. The overall performance
of PPH 3 model is better than that of the RDEU model. Surprisingly it is also better than the EER model,
which is a winner of a choice prediction competition. It is not surprising that the dummy model gives an
overall best performance, due to its data-ﬁtting nature. These results suggest that the process modeling
paradigm is a valid candidate for studying travel choice behavior under risk.
However, for a speciﬁc data set, the ranking does not necessarily hold. For example, in the 7th data set,
the prediction FLL of the RDEU model (-258.51) is a little better than that of the PPH 3 model (-259.16)
and EER model (-260.848). In the 9th data set, the prediction ρ2 of the dummy model (0.281) is a slightly
worse than that of the PPH 3 model (0.290). In the 7th data set, the prediction MSD of the RDEU model
(0.0208) is smaller than that of the EER model (0.0243). These conﬁrm the notion that a model that best ﬁts
the data does not necessarily have the best prediction accuracy.
This cross validation is not a generalizability test - it simply tests the model robustness across subjects
with the same set of scenarios. The general applicability of these four models can be ranked conceivably as:
RDEU > PPH > Dummy = EER. RDEU is able to handle decisions of multiple alternatives with multiple
outcomes and the estimated model can be applied to any other scenarios. PPH model is good at comparing
two alternatives and the extension to multiple alternatives is feasible but not trivial. The dummy and EER
models cannot be applied to scenarios other than those in the estimation set and are the most limited.
8. Conclusions and Future Directions
This study introduces a process model for studying route choice with risky travel times. A probabilistic
version of the priority heuristic (Brandstatter et al. , 2006) is developed and estimated with an SP survey
data set. The PPH model has superior estimation and prediction performance than a previously developed
REDU model, which itself has been shown to be better than a number of other models, including the mean-
standard deviation and expected utility models (Razo & Gao, 2013). We conclude that the process modeling
paradigm is a valid candidate for studying travel behavior under risk. Note that the comparison is based
on a particular dataset, speciﬁcally the subjects are mostly from the university student body, and therefore
generalization to other situations should be made cautiously.
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Table 4. Estimation Results of Four Models
Dummy PPH 3 EER RDEU
1st FLL -457.431 -482.961 -485.338 -499.542
data set ρ2 0.359 0.329 0.329 0.309
estimation MSD 0.0072 0.0158 0.0181 0.0225
1st FLL -320.256 -321.507 -333.477 -345.292
data set ρ2 0.330 0.335 0.315 0.291
prediction MSD 0.0163 0.0195 0.0285 0.0339
2nd FLL -522.492 -541.728 -556.421 -568.765
data set ρ2 0.356 0.338 0.322 0.307
estimation MSD 0.0062 0.0137 0.0191 0.0225
2nd FLL -250.761 -259.833 -260.195 -272.711
data set ρ2 0.340 0.327 0.331 0.300
prediction MSD 0.0139 0.0219 0.0222 0.0298
3rd FLL -559.192 -575.55 -578.36 -598.314
data set ρ2 0.339 0.325 0.324 0.301
estimation MSD 0.0083 0.0151 0.0162 0.0219
3rd FLL -214.849 -227.031 -238.878 -244.607
data set ρ2 0.376 0.353 0.326 0.310
prediction MSD 0.0128 0.0297 0.0331 0.0363
4th FLL -517.45 -541.252 -553.939 -569.253
data set ρ2 0.361 0.338 0.325 0.306
estimation MSD 0.0066 0.0156 0.0203 0.0245
4th FLL -256.699 -260.223 -263.172 -273.48
data set ρ2 0.326 0.327 0.325 0.299
prediction MSD 0.0151 0.0229 0.0221 0.0286
5th FLL -518.298 -538.256 -544.427 -559.936
data set ρ2 0.347 0.328 0.323 0.303
estimation MSD 0.0074 0.0142 0.0178 0.0221
5th FLL -255.333 -263.395 -272.097 -281.897
data set ρ2 0.356 0.347 0.330 0.307
prediction MSD 0.0121 0.0249 0.0257 0.0314
6th FLL -581.01 -597.095 -611.531 -626.835
data set ρ2 0.349 0.336 0.322 0.305
estimation MSD 0.0075 0.0145 0.0190 0.0227
6th FLL -192.864 -204.978 -204.939 -215.538
data set ρ2 0.354 0.328 0.334 0.301
prediction MSD 0.0191 0.0302 0.0298 0.0379
No. of Param. 11 7 5 5
The PH is extended to multiple-outcome situations in (Brandstatter et al. , 2006) where decisions are
based on maximum and minimum outcomes and their associated probabilities. Outcomes in the middle are
not used in the decision making. In a travel choice context, it is more plausible to assume travelers recognize
certain travel time categories (e.g., free ﬂow, normal, congested, jam) rather than a continuous distribution
of travel times. Observed travel time data are inherently discrete and thus support the categorization of
travel time outcomes. Therefore the maximum and minimum travel times and their associated probabilities
can be readily obtained, and the PPH model can be applied. Note that the assumption of only maximum
and minimum outcomes are utilized need to be validated, and intermediate outcomes/probabilities might be
added to the decision process.
The PH could also be extended to multiple-attribute situations. The PH eﬀectively treats minimum out-
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Table 5. Estimation Results of 4 Models. (Continued)
Dummy PPH 3 EER RDEU
7th FLL -526.821 -547.532 -556.79 -583.677
data set ρ2 0.349 0.329 0.320 0.288
estimation MSD 0.0076 0.0182 0.0203 0.0286
7th FLL -248.378 -259.16 -260.848 -258.51
data set ρ2 0.349 0.332 0.333 0.339
prediction MSD 0.0149 0.0158 0.0243 0.0208
8th FLL -464.62 -474.046 -483.669 -503.599
data set ρ2 0.374 0.366 0.357 0.331
estimation MSD 0.0096 0.0149 0.0186 0.0245
8th FLL -310.729 -329.422 -334.664 -339.654
data set ρ2 0.308 0.277 0.270 0.259
prediction MSD 0.0081 0.0216 0.0257 0.0284
9th FLL -513.691 -540.455 -550.812 -568.794
data set ρ2 0.379 0.352 0.342 0.320
estimation MSD 0.0071 0.0178 0.0213 0.0263
9th FLL -262.729 -263.146 -268.815 -275.883
data set ρ2 0.281 0.290 0.280 0.262
prediction MSD 0.0131 0.0173 0.0212 0.0257
10th FLL -493.319 -511.257 -514.907 -532.984
data set ρ2 0.337 0.319 0.317 0.293
estimation MSD 0.0079 0.0174 0.0184 0.0242
10th FLL -283.351 -292.253 -302.613 -310.206
data set ρ2 0.365 0.355 0.337 0.320
prediction MSD 0.0110 0.0170 0.0232 0.0265
No. of Param. 11 7 5 5
come, maximum outcome and the associated probabilities as diﬀerent attributes. The underlying assumption
is that no systematic trade-oﬀ is made; rather, a series of comparisons over the diﬀerent attributes are made
and a choice is made if the diﬀerence of a certain attribute exceeds an aspiration level. In this sense, the PH
follows the perspective of method of “elimination by aspect” proposed by (Tversky, 1972). The PH thus is
well suited to handle multiple-attribute situations in travel choice, e.g, travel time and cost, and the order of
comparison likely depends on the saliency or importance of an attribute.
The PPH model’s deﬁciencies include the discontinuity and limited application in “easy” problems.
Furthermore, for simplicity a decision with only two alternatives is investigated in this study. A decision
with more than two alternatives is common in a travel decision context, and an extension of the PPH model
is needed for its application in real life transportation problems.
We made a strong assumption in the PPH model that all subjects adopted the same comparing order for
all scenarios during the survey. It is reasonable to suppose that subjects can make use of more than one
comparing order, and the comparing orders vary across subjects and contexts. Moreover, we hypothesize
that diﬀerent decision strategies, such as RDEU and PPH might be used in diﬀerent contexts and/or by
diﬀerent people. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to combine these two paradigms (and possibly others)
and investigate which strategies are more likely to be used in diﬀerent decision contexts. This combination
could also potentially resolve the aforementioned problem of the PPH model not working well with “easy”
problems and the discontinuity at extreme points.
All the probabilities in the survey were directly presented to subjects. In real life, however, travelers ex-
perience outcomes and delays and perceive event frequencies without explicit descriptions of probabilities.
Research has shown a diﬀerence between decision from description and decision from experience (Rakow&
Newell, 2010), for example, small probabilities are underweighted in decision from experience, in contrast
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to the overestimation in decision from description. Future research should focus on decision from expe-
rience as travelers learn about the uncertain environment through experience in most situations. The fact
that travelers’ choices collectively aﬀect the network performance through congestion eﬀects should also be
adequately captured (Lu et al. , 2011; Ben-Elia et al. , 2013). There are indeed situations where a combi-
nation of both theories is desired, such as for modeling choice behavior when real-time traﬃc information
describes event probabilities, and a traveler has the decision environment both experienced and described.
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